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Digest:  McCarther v. Pacific Telesis Group 
Rebecca J. Kipper 
Opinion by Moreno, J., with George, C.J., Kennard, Baxter, 
Chin, Corrigan, JJ., and O’Rourke, J.1 
Issue 
Are sick leave policies that provide for an uncapped number 
of compensated days off governed by Labor Code section 233? 
Facts 
Kimberly McCarther and Juan Huerta each took absences 
from work to care for sick family members.2  Although McCarther 
and Huerta did not work for the same employer,3 as members of 
the Communications Workers of America labor union, they were 
subject to the same sickness absence policy under section 5.01F 
of the union’s collective bargaining agreement (CBA).4  Under 
this policy, employees are paid for any day in which they are 
absent from work due to their own illness or injury for up to five 
consecutive days in any seven-day long period.5  There is no limit 
on the number of days that an employee may be absent from 
work,6 but there is an attendance management policy in the CBA 
which sets forth a progressive scheme of discipline, up to 
termination, for excessive absences.7  Although absences for a 
personal illness or injury are compensated under section 5.01F, 
they still constitute an absence which is subject to discipline 
under the attendance management policy.8  In addition to paid 
sick leave, the CBA provides for six paid personal days which are 
not considered absences for the purposes of the attendance 
 
 1  Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, 
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 
Constitution. 
 2 McCarther v. Pac. Telesis Grp., 225 P.3d 538 (Cal. 2010).  McCarther was absent 
for seven consecutive days. Id. at 540.  Huerta was absent for five consecutive days. Id. at 
541. 
 3 McCarther worked for SBC Services, Inc., and Huerta worked for Pacific Bell 
Telephone Company. Id. at 539. 
 4 Id. at 540. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. 
 8 Id. 
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management policy.9  Neither McCarther nor Huerta was 
compensated for the absences to care for sick family members,10 
and neither was disciplined in connection with the absences.11 
McCarther and Huerta brought a representative action 
against their respective employers12 for failure to provide 
employees with paid leave to care for relatives as required by 
Labor Code section 233,13 also called the “kin care” statute.14  
Before class certification was complete, plaintiffs and defendants 
filed motions for summary judgment and summary adjudication 
for a determination of whether the defendants’ sickness absence 
policy under section 5.01F of the CBA qualifies as sick leave as 
defined in section 233.15  The trial court held that since 
employees do not earn or accrue any leave under section 5.01F, 
the defendants’ absence policy did not constitute sick leave under 
section 233, and it granted the defendants’ motion for summary 
judgment.16  The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s 
decision and held that the absence policy did constitute sick leave 
within the meaning of the kin care statute.17  The defendants 
appealed to the California Supreme Court.18 
Analysis 
The court examined the language of the statute in order to 
determine whether it governs defendants’ sick leave policy.19  
First, section 233 requires that if an employer provides sick 
leave, then it must also provide kin care leave in “an amount not 
less than the sick leave that would be accrued during six months 
at the employee’s then current rate of entitlement.”20  It is clear 
 
 9 Id. 
 10 Huerta requested and was granted one paid personal day in connection with his 
family care absences per the personal day off policy. Id. at 541. 
 11 Id. at 540–41. 
 12 The employers involved were SBC Services, Inc., Pacific Telesis Group, Advanced 
Solutions, Inc., Southwestern Bell Video Services, Inc., Pacific Bell Information Services, 
and SBC Telecom, Inc. Id. at 539. 
 13 Id.  Labor Code section 233 requires that an 
employer who provides sick leave for employees shall permit an employee to 
use in any calendar year the employee’s accrued and available sick leave 
entitlement, in the amount not less than the sick leave that would be accrued 
during six months at the employee’s then current rate of entitlement, to attend 
to an illness of a child, parent, spouse, or domestic. 
Id. at 541 (quoting CAL. LAB. CODE § 233 (West 2010)). 
 14 Id. at 541. 
 15 Id.  Section 233 defines sick leave as “accrued increments of compensated leave.” 
Id. (quoting CAL. LAB. CODE § 233). 
 16 Id. at 541. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. at 542 (quoting CAL. LAB. CODE § 233). 
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from this language that in order to apply the statute to an 
employer’s sick leave policy, it is first necessary to calculate the 
amount of sick leave that an employee would accrue in a six-
month period.21  Under the defendants’ policy, there is no cap to 
the number of days that employees can be absent for sick leave 
as long as they operate within the attendance management 
policy.22  Therefore, it is not possible to determine how many 
days of sick leave that an employee would accrue in six months in 
order to apply section 233.23 
Plaintiffs proposed, and the court dismissed, two ways in 
which kin care leave could be calculated under defendants’ 
absence policy in order to make section 233 applicable.24  First, as 
to plaintiffs’ suggestion that the rate of entitlement during any 
six-month period is the five-day increment of leave that an 
employee earns,25 the court explained that under the defendants’ 
plan, the only period for which the entitlement can really be 
calculated is for a seven-day period because the amount of 
compensated time is not “banked.”26  Therefore, since the rate of 
entitlement cannot be calculated for a six-month period, the 
legislature did not intend section 233 to apply to sick leave 
policies like the defendants’.27  Further, the Legislature’s 
adoption of section 234, which prohibits employers from counting, 
for disciplinary purposes, any sick leave taken under section 233, 
supports this conclusion.28  Presently, due to the lack of a limit on 
the number of absences, the defendants’ absence control policy is 
the only limit on its sick leave policy.29  Thus, if section 233 
applied to the defendants’ absence control policy, then 
section 234 would also apply and would prohibit the defendants’ 
only limit to the number of sick days taken for kin care.30  Since, 
an employee would be limited in the amount of personal sick 
leave he could take (by the attendance management policy), but 
not in the amount of kin care sick leave he could take, this would 
have the effect of allowing the employee to take more kin care 
sick leave than personal sick leave.31  This result would be 
 
 21 Id. at 542. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. at 542–43. 
 27 Id. at 543. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id.  For example, if defendants cannot utilize their attendance management 
policy, then an employee would be allowed to take unlimited, compensated five day 
absences for kin care as long as he returned to work for a partial day each week. Id. 
 31 Id. 
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directly contrary to the plain language of the statute, which 
contemplates that employees will only be permitted to use half of 
their annually accrued sick leave for kin care.32 
The court found the plaintiffs’ alternative proposal for 
calculating the kin care entitlement—that it should be based on 
the amount of sick leave actually used—equally unpersuasive 
because it presumed, wrongly, that section 233 is not concerned 
with certainty and precision.33  The court noted the flaw in this 
method, which is that it would be impossible for an employer to 
determine the exact amount of kin care leave to which its 
employees are entitled.34  The statute’s clear intent is to provide 
employers with precise guidelines as to an employee’s kin care 
entitlement.35  The plaintiffs’ interpretation of the statute ignores 
this intention and therefore was rejected.36 
Finally, plaintiffs’ argument as to calculating kin care 
entitlement failed because it was “self-defeating.”37  The clear 
intent of the legislature, illustrated by the plain language of the 
statute, is to give employers notice of how many kin care days 
they were required to provide.38  Plaintiffs’ argument, which 
proposed two different ways of calculating kin care entitlement, 
resulted in two different calculations under the same policy, 
which clearly violates the intent of the statute.39  Thus, the court 
rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments and concluded that an 
employer must have clear guidelines as to an employee’s kin care 
requirements and, therefore, that the amount of kin care leave to 
which an employee is entitled must be ascertainable from the 
employer’s absence policy in order for section 233 to apply.40 
In addition to being limited to absence policies in which the 
amount of kin care leave is ascertainable, the court noted that 
the reach of section 233 is also limited by the definition of sick 
leave in the statute.41  The statute defines sick leave as “accrued 
increments of compensated leave,” and further states that 
employees may only utilize “accrued and available” sick leave for 
 
 32 Id.  Section 233 plainly states that an employee may take, in a one-year period, 
kin care leave equal to the amount of regular leave days accrued in a six-month period. 
Id. at 541 (quoting CAL. LAB. CODE § 233). 
 33 Id. at 543. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. at 543–44. 
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kin care.42  In order to determine if the defendants’ sickness 
absence policy is sick leave as defined in the statute, the court 
analyzed the meaning of the word “accrued.”43  The most usual 
definition of accrued is to accumulate over a period of time.44  
Yet, even under the plaintiffs’ proposed, non-temporal definition 
of accrual as leave that is earned but not yet paid,45 it is still 
clear that section 233 does not apply because the parties had 
previously stipulated that employees under the defendants’ sick 
leave policy do not accumulate or bank any specific number of 
paid sick days in a year.46 
The court dismissed plaintiffs’ contention that the definition 
of the word accrued changes depending on how it is used in the 
statute.47  The plaintiffs claimed that the word accrued, when 
used in the statute to explain that employees must be allowed to 
use “accrued and available sick leave” for kin care, means to 
“come into existence,”48 and thus, since the defendants’ policy 
provides employees with an enforceable right to use sick leave, 
the employees have accrued leave.  Therefore, according to the 
plaintiffs’ argument, the policy is controlled by section 233.49  
This reasoning is flawed for two reasons.  First, although Black’s 
Law Dictionary does define the word accrue as a right coming 
into existence, it only does so in the framework of a cause of 
action.50  Since section 233 does not concern causes of action, a 
more usual and ordinary definition, such as to accumulate, 
applies here.51  Second, if plaintiffs’ definition is accepted, then 
the word accrued would have the same definition as the word 
available.52  The rules of statutory interpretation mandate that a 
construction which makes a word a surplusage must be 
avoided.53  Therefore, since accepting plaintiffs’ definition would 
make the word available unnecessary, it is clear that the 
Legislature intended the two words to have different meanings, 
and plaintiffs’ proposed definition was rejected.54 
 
 42 Id. at 544 (quoting CAL. LAB. CODE § 233(a), (b)(4)). 
 43 Id. at 544. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 22 (8th ed. 2005)). 
 51 Id. at 544. 
 52 Available is defined as “present and ready for use.” Id. at 545 (quoting AMERICAN 
HERITAGE DICTIONARY 123 (4th ed. 2000)). 
 53 Id. (citing Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Emp’t & Hous. Comm’n., 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1387 
(1987)). 
 54 Id. at 545. 
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The second, and final, use of the word accrued appears in the 
statute’s definition of the term sick leave as “accrued increments 
of compensated leave.”55  The court rejected the Court of Appeal’s 
contention that the words “accrued” and “increments” mean the 
same thing in this definition because it would cause the word 
increments to be surplusage, which is clearly not what the 
legislature intended.56  In addition, the court stated again that 
the usual and commonsense definition of the word accrued means 
to accumulate,57 and once again concluded that section 233 
applies only to sick leave policies that provide for an accumulated 
number of days off; not to policies like the defendants’ that 
provide for an uncapped and unbanked number of days off.58 
Finally, the court turned to an analysis of the legislative 
intent of the statute.59  Legislative intent must be ascertained by 
examining both the language of the statute and its legislative 
history.60  The fact that section 233 includes a definition of the 
term sick leave shows that the legislature was aware that the 
term could have more than one meaning.61  If the legislature had 
meant for every type of sick leave policy to be covered by the 
statute, they would have stated that expressly; since they did 
not, it is clear that they meant to exclude some types of sick leave 
plans.62  Even though the plain language of the statute clearly 
shows a legislative intent to limit the types of policies to which it 
applies, the court went a step further by examining the statute’s 
legislative history.63  The statutory history is filled with examples 
of intent to limit the reach of the statute.64  The court noted that 
the phrase “sick leave, as defined” is found throughout the 
historical documents, which illustrates that the legislature 
understood the definition in the statute to be limiting.65  In 
addition, the court found it conclusive that, before the statute 
could pass the legislature, the definition of the term sick leave 
was changed by amendment from a very inclusive definition that 
would have likely included defendants’ policy to the current 
definition, which is much more restrictive.66  The court concluded 
 
 55 Id. (quoting CAL. LAB. CODE § 233(b)(4)). 
 56 Id. at 545. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. at 542 (citing Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Emp’t & Hous. Comm’n., 43 Cal. 3d 1379, 1387 
(1987)). 
 61 Id. at 545. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. at 546. 
 66 Id. 
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that the legislative intent was to limit the types of absence 
policies to which section 233 applied to only those defined in the 
statute, i.e., those which provide for an accumulated or banked 
system of sick leave.67 
Holding 
The court reversed the Court of Appeal.68  The court held 
that the kin care statute does not apply to sick leave policies 
which provide for an uncapped number of compensated days off 
because it is impossible to determine the amount of sick leave 
that an employee may take under such a policy.69  Therefore, 
since there is no limit to the number of days that employees may 
be absent from work under the defendants’ sick leave policy, the 
kin care statute does not apply, and the defendants are not 
required to provide employees with paid absences to care for sick 
family members.70 
Legal Significance 
The court’s holding prevents an employee who is subject to a 
paid sick leave policy that provides for an uncapped number of 
days off from demanding paid kin care leave under section 233.  
However, the court’s decision does not preclude such an employer 
from complying with section 233.  On the other hand, an 
employer that provides sick leave in the form of an accrual-based 
system is required to comply with the requirements of the kin 
care statute by providing its employees with paid kin care leave. 
 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. at 543. 
 70 Id. at 546. 
